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In this paper we propose an alternative approach for the assessment of net-
work vulnerability under random and intentional attacks as compared to the
results obtained from the “vulnerability function”given by Criado et al. [Int. J.
Comput. Math., 86 (2)(2009), pp. 209-218]. By using spectral and statistical
measurements, we assess robustness as the antonym to vulnerability of complex
networks and suggest a tentative ranking for vulnerability, based on the inter-
pretation of quantified network characteristics. We conclude that vulnerability
function, derived from the networks degree distribution and its variations only,
is not general enough to reflect the lack of robustness due to the specific con-
figurations in graphs with hierarchical or centralized structures. The spectral
and statistical metrics, on the other hand, capture different aspects of network
topology which provide a more thorough assessment of network vulnerability.
1 Introduction
Complex networks have several interdependent elements with non-trivial lay-
outs in which the degree of complexity depends on the configurations and the
level of interaction between those elements. One important observation giv-
ing rise to studies of the topology of complex networks is that “the structure
affects function”[1] and therefore the architecture of the network can be used
to understand and predict dynamical processes that affect its performance and
flow distribution as well as network stability and tolerance. Researchers investi-
gating the structure and behavior of complex networks have proposed different
methodologies and metrics to (i) identify vulnerable and weak points (ii) locate
their positions in the networks and (iii) assess network robustness and tolerance
to errors and attacks [2-6]. These metrics can be classified as basic connectivity
metrics, spectral measurements and statistical measurements. Basic connectiv-
ity metrics include vertex- (node-) connectivity and edge- (link-) connectivity
[7] that represent network cohesion and adhesion and its sensitivity to the re-
moval of nodes and links. Spectral measurements are those which relate network
topology to connectivity strength and graph cohesion through analysis of the
spectrum of the networks adjacency matrix. Examples of well-established spec-
tral metrics include algebraic connectivity [8] to describe network robustness
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against node and link failures [8-9], and spectral gap analysis to quantify ex-
pansibility of the network and the property of “Good Expansion”[10]. Statistical
measurements of complex networks on the other hand provide quantifications
for rather intuitive underlying properties through studying the most frequent
patterns and building blocks of the networks. Notable examples of this class
of measurements include node-degree distribution, clustering coefficient, aver-
age path-length, node betweenness and central-point dominance proposed by
different authors and listed in [11] along with numerous other metrics.
One recent addition to the stable of vulnerability metrics which relates ro-
bustness to network regularity has been proposed by Criado et al. [12] and has
been used on several occasions to support network vulnerability assessments [12-
14]. This metric, called the “vulnerability function”, is based on an axiomatic
rather than intuitive approach to the concept of network robustness and pro-
vides a relatively easy to calculate measure of network vulnerability. In outline,
this is a normalized measure which provides values close to one for the most
vulnerable graphs decreasing to values closer to zero for more robust graphs.
Boundary values of zero or one may only be attained asymptotically and con-
sequently there exist graphs which have vulnerability values arbitrarily close to
either zero or one. This may not necessarily happen in graphs with a fixed size,
requiring the asymptotic computation to take place in polynomial time [12].
The rationale behind the definition is that any vulnerability measure should be
invariant under isomorphisms and that it should not increase by adding only
edges (links) to the original graph (although this is not necessary when vertices
are added). The definition of the vulnerability function νσ : Ω → [0, 1] for the
set Ω of all possible finite graphs is given in Criado et al. [12] as a function
verifying the following properties:
(i) νσ is invariant under isomorphisms.
(ii) νσ(G
′
) ≥ νσ(G) if G is obtained from G′ by adding edges.
(iii) νσ(G) is computable in polynomial time with respect to the number of
vertices of G.
Based on these criteria the authors [12] have proposed the vulnerability of a
graph G as:
νσ(G) = exp(
σ
n
+ n− |E| − 2 + 2
n
) (1)
where n is the number of vertices, |E| is the number of edges and σ is the
standard deviation of the degree distribution. The measure has subsequently
been deployed as an accurate and computable definition of network vulnerability
[13-14].
However, we argue that the vulnerability measure described above consti-
tutes only a partially reliable comparison for different types of network. Specif-
ically, whilst our experiments show that the definition is supported by some ex-
amples that reasonably compare the vulnerability of networks possessing more
or less the same size and structures, it fails to properly rank vulnerability when
networks of different sizes and structures are compared. In particular, and as
will be demonstrated, complete regular graphs of relatively low order are found
to be more vulnerable by this measure than graphs which are intuitively (and
technically) understood as more vulnerable due to the existence of bridges and
cut vertices whose removal disconnects the network causing isolation of some
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nodes from the source(s). Notably, intuitive concepts of graph strength such
as vertex connectivity (cohesion) and edge connectivity (adhesion) are not cap-
tured by this measure. Therefore, it is observed that, taking robustness as the
antonym for vulnerability to random failures or intentional attacks, graph cohe-
sion as a fundamental constituent of robustness is ignored by this vulnerability
function which yields computations that are incompatible with other robustness
measurements reported in the literature. It is also reported by Holmgren [15]
that the vulnerability function fails to capture actions taken to enhance the
resilience of networks. These observations lead us to an alternative approach
based on the quantification of network invariants and statistical properties fol-
lowed by heuristic interpretations. In the following sections, we provide two
examples of four network models with different layouts and structures, derive
the specific set of relevant spectral and statistical network metrics that we use
to relate network architecture to robustness, and utilize these metrics to assess
network vulnerability against scenarios of node and link failures. We then com-
pare our findings with the outcome of applying the vulnerability function in
Equation (1) and comment on the functions usefulness. Furthermore, we make
recommendations on the interpretation and utilization of spectral and statistical
measurements as a basis for the structural analysis of networks so as to obtain
a comprehensive and more generically applicable assessment of robustness and
vulnerability.
2 Measures of network robustness and vulnera-
bility
Let G = (N,E) be a connected unweighted network consisting of the set of
vertices N and the set of edges E, with distinct vertices S for the source and
T for the sink(s). Following [7], vertex-connectivity κ(G) also known as graph
cohesion is defined as the smallest number of vertices whose removal leaves the
graph disconnected. Edge-connectivity µ(G) also known as graph adhesion is
similarly defined to be the smallest number of edges whose removal disconnects
the graph. Algebraic connectivity λ2(G) first introduced in [8] and studied in [9]
for its scope of applicability, is the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian
matrix of a network. The Laplacian matrix of G with n nodes is a n×n matrix
Q=∆-A, where ∆= diag(di) and di is the degree of node i and A is the adja-
cency matrix of G. The algebraic connectivity λ2(G) is a positive value whose
magnitude indicates the level of connectivity in the graph. Larger values of alge-
braic connectivity represent higher graph robustness against efforts to decouple
parts of the graph. Spectral Gap s(G) is defined as the difference between the
first and second eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A with sufficiently large
values of spectral gap being a necessary condition for Good Expansion proper-
ties. Low values of Spectral Gap indicate a lack of Good Expansion properties
usually represented by bridges, cut vertices and network bottlenecks [10].
The statistical measurements are widely used in the complex networks lit-
erature to quantify network structure in relation with vulnerability. Here, we
employ some of these statistical measurements to provide support for our analy-
sis of network vulnerability based on the spectral measurements. These include;
link density q(G) defined as the fraction between the total and the maximum
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number of possible links [9] to assess availability of alternative routes in the case
of failure, mean node-degree ≺k as a measure of average global connectivity
[11] or nodal strength, average path-length l(G) [11] reflecting the ease of access
in the network and reciprocally related to the efficiency in dispatching flow, and
central-point dominance CB(G) defined as the average betweenness difference of
the most central point and all others [16] which quantifies the extent to which a
network is decentralized or concentrated (around a centre). A detailed overview
of the applicability and relevance of these metrics to topology-related network
vulnerability can be found in [11] and references therein.
3 Examples on network robustness analysis
3.1 Example 1
Consider the complete graph of order four K4 (n = 4, |E| = 6) and the hi-
erarchically structured graph G1 (n = 8, |E| = 10) illustrated below (Figure
1). Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that these graphs represent
flow networks with a single source S and a single sink T and with the same
weight and capacity allocated to every node and link. It is readily observed
from Equation (1) that νσ(K4)=0.0302 and νσ(G1)=0.0269 which suggests that
K4 is more vulnerable than G1 with respect to random and intentional attacks.
However, we show that this is not a reliable finding by applying the following
attack scenario to demonstrate that G1 has smaller edge and vertex connectiv-
ity values than K4. While removal of the only edge attached to the source will
render G1 disconnected, no single edge removal will result in disconnection of
K4. The higher cohesion and hence greater strength of K4 becomes apparent
by considering that, due to the equal impact of the attacks to the edges with
the same capacity, a complete loss of access from the source to the sink in K4
requires at least three times more such efforts as compared to G1. A similar dis-
connection strategy resulting in the removal of the node (and its edges) incident
to the source in G1 and comparing that to the total number of required node
removals to disconnect K4 demonstrates higher adhesion and greater robust-
ness of K4 which, as far as the robustness and tolerance to failures is concerned,
contradicts the vulnerability measurements computed by Equation (1).
Figure 1: Comparison of the structures for K4 and G1
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3.2 Example 2
The next example provides a comparison of the vulnerability between the com-
plete graph K5 (n = 5, |E| = 10) of order five and G2 (n = 13, |E| = 21) a graph
with loosely connected community structures (Figure 2). Similar flow network
assumptions are made in this example with the additional assumption of mul-
tiple sinks in each network. Equation (1) yields relative network vulnerability
values of νσ(K5)=0.0014 and νσ(G2)=0.0001 which suggests that K5 is more
vulnerable than G2 with respect to random and intentional attacks. However,
by employing a strategy similar to the one developed in the previous example,
it is found that K5 enjoys a greater degree of cohesion (adhesion) than G2 in
light of the fact that disconnection of G2 can take place by only one effort which
is the removal of any edge incident to the source while it takes four such efforts
to disconnect K5. In other words the existence of bridges and cut vertices (ar-
ticulation points) in G2 makes this network less tolerant to attacks than K5
which benefits from a complete regular structure with redundant routes from
the source to the sinks.
Figure 2: Comparison of the structures for K5 and G2
4 Connectivity and statistical measures compared
to vulnerability function
Numerical calculations presented in Table (1) illustrate the connectivity, spec-
tral and statistical measurements of the studied examples along with vulnera-
bility values calculated for these networks. Being able to directly compare any
two networks and rank them according to their level of vulnerability largely de-
pends on the nature of the problem and existence of conclusive measurements
followed by heuristic interpretations. In other words a unique graph metric to
satisfy all aspects of connectivity and robustness may not exist, as also reported
elsewhere [17], and therefore the appropriate metric(s) for making a judgment
on network robustness need to be selected from a set of measurements that
capture different appropriate information. However, derived measurements for
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particular examples given in the previous section do support a tentative ranking
for network vulnerability.
Table 1: Comparison of the networks based on vulnerability, connectivity and statistical mea-
surements
G νσ(G) s(G) λ2(G) κ(G) q(G) ≺k l(G) CB(G)
G1 2.69 0.99 0.4 1 0.36 2.5 2.00 0.46
G2 0.01 0.27 0.21 1 0.27 3.25 2.65 0.63
K4 3.02 2 4 3 1 3 1.00 0
K5 0.14 3 5 4 1 4 1.00 0
As shown in Table (1), the vulnerability function in Equation (1) ranks the
networks in the order of νσ(G2)≤νσ(K5)≤νσ(G1)≤νσ(K4) with network G2 the
least vulnerable and K4 the most vulnerable. However, based on the other
metrics, it can be strongly suggested that G2 is the most vulnerable with G1,
K4 and K5 being the less vulnerable networks.
5 Discussion
It is observed that the trend in the values of algebraic connectivity is perfectly
followed by all other connectivity and statistical metrics with only the excep-
tion of the Mean node-degree. An interpretation of this observation is that
graph robustness, as reflected by vertex connectivity and algebraic connectivity,
is replicated by Good Expansion properties quantified by larger spectral gaps.
The existence of alternative and redundant routes (represented by link density)
along with smaller average distances, increases the networks survivability and
facilitates reachability in the networks that results in the improvement of ro-
bustness to failures. Central-point dominance provides some insight to network
design and tolerance to failures by measuring the extent to which one individual
node controls the flow in the network. Higher central-point dominance, as seen
in the case of G2, may lead to higher vulnerability due to the consequences of
failing central point(s), contrary to more decentralized (e.g. G1) or completely
distributed networks (e.g. K4 and K5). The trend in the Mean node-degree is
in an agreement with other metrics for the most invulnerable graphs K4 and K5
while the differences observed otherwise seem to be more related to the size and
degree distribution than the graph layouts. It is worth noting that vertex and
edge connectivity are configuration-only measures independent of the number of
graph vertices. Algebraic connectivity, on the other hand depends on both the
number of nodes and their respective configurations. Given that the vulnerabil-
ity function in Equation (1) depends on the network degree distribution and its
variations [14], a degree of correlation between this measurement and the alge-
braic connectivity values would be expected theoretically. Its non-existence in
this instance remains unexplained. We also note that the edge connectivity of a
subgraph can exceed the overall edge connectivity of the graph. This may hap-
pen in networks with hierarchical structures (e.g. G1) or in hub-spoke networks
with loosely related clusters (e.g. G2). Moreover, it is observed that mesh-like
distributed networks enjoy better accessibility among the nodes and therefore
have an overall larger degree of reliability and lower vulnerability than central-
ized and hub-spoke networks. This is due to the fact that mesh-like structures
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posses a certain level of path-redundancy and they resemble the most invul-
nerable graphs i.e. complete regular graphs, at least locally. Hierarchical and
hub-spoke structures on the other hand, fall into the category of sparse Non-
Good Expansion networks which typically have low connectivity values along
with the presence of the bottlenecks and cut vertices. These are networks with
relatively small spectral gaps resulting from the small difference between the
first and the second eigenvalues of the network adjacency matrix. Dekker [18]
suggests that the most robust networks are those optimally connected in the
sense of having vertex and edge connectivity as high and average distance as
low as possible, with symmetric and node-similar structure and balanced dis-
tribution of the flow along the links. These properties can be perfectly found
in complete graphs K4 and K5 making them the most robust networks among
the others, as discussed. The vulnerability of the two other examples can be
assessed based on the other criteria listed in this work or by considering other
network metrics and characteristics. These observations suggest that any quan-
tification of vulnerability needs to adequately reflect different network patterns
and structures as well as the variations in graph size, vertex degree and nodal
configurations.
6 Conclusions
Examples presented in this paper showed that the discussed vulnerability func-
tion proposed in [12] does not provide a reliable measurement of network vul-
nerability and in particular does not capture important aspects of structural
vulnerability such as connectivity and cohesion. Therefore, construction of
a closed-form mathematical expression to quantify network vulnerability will
very much depend on the successful incorporation of different network measure-
ments including those discussed in this work. As demonstrated, an alternative
approach based on the derivation of spectral and statistical measurements of
networks can be developed by which different aspects of network topology in
relation to robustness and vulnerability may be investigated. However, the ex-
tent to which these metrics explain non-topological aspects of network reliability
and redundancy needs to be scrutinized. Overall, a thorough and realistic as-
sessment of network vulnerability will depend on the nature and objectives of
the analysis as well as the existence of conclusive measurements followed by
heuristic interpretations.
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